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Abstract
The present paper demonstrates the failure of the principle of excluded middle (PEM) in the
lattice of all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (that is usually defined as quantum
logic). Namely, it is shown that for a qubit, a proposition and its negation can be both false.
Since PEM is the assumed theorem of quantum logic, this raises the question: If PEM holds in
the orthocomplemented lattice of all propositions of the quantum system, then how the failure
of PEM in quantum logic can be explained? Alternatively, if the propositions relating to the
quantum system do not obey PEM, then what is the semantics of those propositions? Possible
answers to these questions are analyzed in the present paper.
Keywords: Quantum mechanics; Closed linear subspaces; Lattice structures; Excluded middle;
Intuitionistic quantum logic; Supervaluationism
1 Introduction and preliminaries
Recall that a qubit is a two-state quantum-mechanical system. Correspondingly, any pure qubit
state |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 /∈ {0} (where {0} is the zero-vector space containing only vector 0) can be repre-
sented as a linear superposition of two states |Ψ
(R)
1 〉 /∈ {0} and |Ψ
(R)
2 〉 /∈ {0} (such that |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 6=
|Ψ
(R)
1 〉, |Ψ
(R)
2 〉), namely,
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 = c1|Ψ
(R)
1 〉+ c2|Ψ
(R)
2 〉 , (1)
where n ∈ {1, 2}, Q,R ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and c1, c2 ∈ C. The states |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉, |Ψ
(R)
1 〉 and |Ψ
(R)
2 〉 are the
eigenvectors of the projection operators Pˆ
(Q)
n , Pˆ
(R)
1 , and Pˆ
(R)
2 , respectively, defined by the common
formula through the Kronecker delta δab calculation, explicitly,
Pˆ (b)a =
1
2
[
1− (−1)aδb3 (−1)
a(−δb1 + iδb2)
(−1)a(−δb1 − iδb2) 1 + (−1)
aδb3
]
. (2)
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The column spaces (a.k.a. images and ranges) of the operators Pˆ
(Q)
n denoted as ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) are
closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space H. Explicitly, ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) is the subset of the vectors
|Ψ〉 ∈ H that are in the image of Pˆ
(Q)
n , i.e.
ran(Pˆ (Q)n ) ≡
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H : Pˆ (Q)n |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
}
. (3)
Dually, ran(1ˆ − Pˆ
(Q)
n ) = ker(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) stands for the null space (a.k.a. kernel) of the projector Pˆ
(Q)
n ,
i.e., the subset of the vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H that are mapped to zero by Pˆ
(Q)
n , namely,
ran(1ˆ− Pˆ (Q)n ) = ker(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ≡
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H :
(
1ˆ− Pˆ (Q)n
)
|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
}
, (4)
where 1ˆ denotes the identity operator. For that reason, the projector 1ˆ− Pˆ
(Q)
n can be understood
as the negation of Pˆ
(Q)
n , i.e.,
¬Pˆ (Q)n = 1ˆ− Pˆ
(Q)
n . (5)
It results from the formula (2) that
Pˆ
(Q)
1 + Pˆ
(Q)
2 = 1ˆ (6)
for any Q. Hence, in the two-dimensional Hilbert space H = C2 one has
¬Pˆ (Q)n = Pˆ
(Q)
n+(−1)n−1
. (7)
Consistent with the assumption of Birkhoff and von Neumann [1], the set of all the closed linear
subspaces of C2, namely,
L(C2) =
{
ran(0ˆ), ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ), ran(Pˆ
(1)
2 ), . . . , ran(Pˆ
(3)
1 ), ran(Pˆ
(3)
2 ), ran(1ˆ)
}
, (8)
where ran(0ˆ) = {0} and ran(1ˆ) = C2, form a complete lattice called the Hilbert lattice (L(C2),≤)
where the symbol ≤ denotes the partial ordering on L(C2). This partial ordering is defined by
ran(0ˆ) ≤ ran(Pˆ (Q)n ) ⇐⇒ {0} ⊆ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) , (9)
ran(Pˆ (Q)n ) ≤ ran(1ˆ) ⇐⇒ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ⊆ C
2 . (10)
Because (L(C2),≤) is complete, it has join andmeet operations denoted ∨ and ∧ [2, 3]. Particularly,
for each pair of elements ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) and ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) of L(C2), where ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) 6= ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) and
m ∈ {1, 2}, one has
2
ran(Pˆ (Q)n ) ∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) = ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∩ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) = {0} , (11)
ran(Pˆ (Q)n ) ∨ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) =
(
ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n+(−1)n−1
) ∩ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m+(−1)m−1
)
)⊥
= ({0})⊥ = C2 , (12)
where (·)⊥ stands for the orthogonal complement of (·).
Let the qubit be prepared in the pure state given by the vector |Ψ〉 residing in the closed linear
subspace Hp ∈ L(C
2). Then, the logical proposition P
(Q)
n asserting that this vector lies in the
range of the projection operator Pˆ
(Q)
n on C
2 can be set forth by
P (Q)n ≡ Prop
(
|Ψ〉 ∈ Hp ∧ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )
)
, (13)
whereHp ∧ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) stands for the meet operation on the closed linear subspacesHp and ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )
of L(C2).
In a dual manner, the proposition asserting that this vector lies in the kernel of the projection
operator Pˆ
(Q)
n can be defined as the negation ¬P
(Q)
n of the proposition P
(Q)
n and set forth by
¬P (Q)n ≡ Prop
(
|Ψ〉 ∈ Hp ∧ ker(Pˆ
(Q)
n )
)
= Prop
(
|Ψ〉 ∈ Hp ∧ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n+(−1)n−1
)
)
, (14)
where Hp ∧ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n+(−1)n−1
) is the meet of H|Ψ〉 and ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n+(−1)n−1
) of L(C2).
In line with these definitions, if the qubit is prepared in the state |Ψ
(R)
m 〉 /∈ {0} belonging to either
the range ran(Pˆ
(R)
1 ) or the range ran(Pˆ
(R)
2 ), the proposition P
(R)
1 and its negation ¬P
(R)
1 are
P
(R)
1 = Prop
(
|Ψ(R)m 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m )∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
1 )
)
=


Prop
(
|Ψ
(R)
1 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(R)
1 )
)
, m = 1
Prop
(
|Ψ
(R)
2 〉 ∈ {0}
)
, m = 2
, (15)
¬P
(R)
1 = Prop
(
|Ψ(R)m 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m )∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
2 )
)
=


Prop
(
|Ψ
(R)
1 〉 ∈ {0}
)
, m = 1
Prop
(
|Ψ
(R)
2 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(R)
2 )
)
, m = 2
. (16)
As |Ψ
(R)
m 〉 /∈ {0}, the proposition Prop
(
|Ψ
(R)
m 〉 ∈ {0}
)
must be a contradiction, which means that
P
(R)
1 and ¬P
(R)
1 cannot be false together.
However, if the qubit is prepared in the superposition of the states |Ψ
(R)
1 〉 and |Ψ
(R)
2 〉 shown in (1),
i.e., in the state |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 /∈ {0} located in the subspace ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ), then the proposition P
(R)
1 and its
negation ¬P
(R)
1 are both false:
3
P
(R)
1 = Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
1 )
)
=Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ {0}
)
, (17)
¬P
(R)
1 = Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
2 )
)
=Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ {0}
)
. (18)
This is confusing because the principle of excluded middle (PEM for short), which states that a
proposition and its negation cannot be false together [4], is supposed to hold in the lattice (L(H),≤)
– i.e., the lattice of all the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space H – usually defined as quantum logic
[5, 6].
Assuming after [7] that there is an isomorphism between the lattice of quantum propositions Q –
i.e., the orthocomplemented lattice of all propositions of a quantum mechanical system – and the
lattice (L(H),≤), this raises the question: If PEM holds in Q, then how the failure of PEM in
(L(H),≤) demonstrated in (17) and (18) can be explained?
Alternatively, if quantum propositions do not obey PEM, then what is the semantics of those
propositions?
The present paper analyzes possible answers to these questions.
2 Intuitionistic quantum logic
Let us start with the analysis of the statement that quantum propositions reject PEM.
From a mathematical point of view, to interpret quantum propositions in terms of the intuitionistic
propositional logic (in which PEM is not valid), one must find mathematical objects in quantum
theory that form the structure of a Heyting algebra, i.e., a semantic of intuitionistic propositional
logic.
Recall that the pseudo-complement ¬a of an element a of the Heyting algebra H is the supremum
of the set {b : b ∧ a = 0} such that b ∈ H and a belongs to this set, i.e., a ∧ ¬a = 0 holds [8].
Suppose that the elements of the partially ordered set L(C2) are also elements of the Heyting al-
gebra H, i.e., the bounded lattice with join and meet operations ∨ and ∧ and with least element
{0} (denoted by 0) and greatest element C2 (denoted by 1).
Consider such a subset S of the poset L(C2) that
S= L(C2) \
{
{0},C2
}
. (19)
The subset S has a single upper bound which is greatest element C2. To be sure, for any pair of
ranges ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) and ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) in S, where ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) 6= ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ), one has C2 ⊇ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) and
4
C
2 ⊇ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ), at the same time as ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) and ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) are incomparable with each other.
This means that any set
{
ran(Pˆ (Q)n ) : ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) = {0}
}
(20)
does not contain a minimal element, i.e., a pseudo-complement. Hence, the closed linear subspaces
of the Hilbert space C2 cannot form a pseudo-complemented lattice and, as a result, an acceptable
Heyting algebra H.
Still, there is a possibility to replace the Hilbert lattice (L(C2),≤) with some other (distributive)
lattice that defines a Heyting algebra.
For example, in the paper [9], as a replacement of (L(C2),≤), the lattice O(G2) is suggested whose
elements are functions from the partially ordered set C(C2) of all unital commutative sub-C∗-
algebras C of C2 to the poset L(C2). As the result of this, instead of being associated with a
single closed subspace of C2, a proposition corresponds to a family of the subspaces, one family per
classical context. The suggested lattice O(G2) is the topology of the quantum phase space G2, and
as such defines a Heyting algebra.
Be this as it may, it should, however, be noted that the motivation for any alternative lattice is
somewhat weaker than the motivation for the Hilbert lattice.
Furthermore, while in quantum logic, the assignment of truth-values to the elements of the Hilbert
lattice takes the values from a set like {0, 1} which is identified with false and true, in the intu-
itionistic quantum logic proposed in [9], the truth assignment on O(G2) is required to take values
from some general and abstract “truth object” (like a topos) whose semantical interpretation is
not that clear.
3 Supervaluational quantum logic
Now, let us analyze the statement that quantum propositions obey PEM.
We will start with the observation made in [10]: Let A and B be the verifiable propositions relating
to the quantum-mechanical system. The proposition is called actual for a particular realization of
the system (where by particular realization one can understand the quantum state |Ψ〉 in which
the system is prepared) if this proposition has a definite truth value. According to [10], actuality
of A ∨ B does not necessarily imply actuality of A or actuality of B, i.e., there exists a state (a
superposition of states) for which A ∨B is actual, but neither A nor B are actual.
This observation speaks in favor of supervaluationism. Let us briefly recall some definitions regard-
ing supervaluationism needed in this paper.
5
In a word, supervaluationism is a semantics that allows one to apply the tautologies of propositional
logic in cases where truth values are undefined [11].
Supervaluationism retains the classical consequence relation and classical laws whilst admitting
truth-value gaps (meaning that some propositions have absolutely no truth-value). Accordingly, a
disjunction as well as a conjunction may have a definite truth value even when its components do
not [12].
For example, given that the concept of a heap lacks sharp boundaries, the proposition “N grain(s)
of wheat is a heap” cannot have a truth-value since no one grain of wheat can be identified as
making the difference between being a heap and not being a heap.
However, it is logically true for any number of grains of wheat that it either does or does not
make a heap. In other words, the disjunction of the propositions P = “N grain(s) of wheat is a
heap” and ¬P = “N grain(s) of wheat is not a heap” is an instance of the valid schema P ∨ ¬P
and so, according to supervaluationism, it should be true regardless of whether or not its dis-
juncts have a truth value; that is, it should be true in all interpretations (in the given example, for
any number of grains N). As a consequence, supervaluation semantics is no longer truth-functional.
If, in general, something is true in all interpretations, supervaluationism describes it as “supertrue”,
while something false in all interpretations is described as “superfalse” [13].
From a mathematical point of view, to interpret quantum propositions in terms of a supervalua-
tionary logic, one must impose upon the closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space a structure
that allows truth-value gaps. The collection of invariant-subspace lattices that have no mutual
nontrivial members provides a natural candidate for such a structure.
Particularly, to form this “gappy” structure, it is enough to strengthen the assumption of the
Hilbert lattice (L(C2),≤). That is, the logical predicate of the assumption of the Hilbert lattice
Φ
(
H′
)
≡ H′ ⊆ C2 , (21)
i.e., the rule defining the set L(C2) of all the closed linear subspaces H′ of the Hilbert space C2
using set-builder notation
L(C2) =
{
H′ : Φ
(
H′
)}
, (22)
should be replaced by a stronger predicate, namely
Φ
(
H′, Pˆ (R)m
)
≡ Φ
(
H′
)
and Pˆ (R)m : H
′ 7→ H′ . (23)
As per this strengthened rule, each partially ordered set
6
L
(
Pˆ (R)m
)
≡
{
H′ : Φ
(
H′, Pˆ (R)m
)}
(24)
can include only those closed linear subspaces H′ that are invariant under the projection operator
Pˆ
(R)
m . That is, the image of every vector |Ψ〉 in those H′ under Pˆ
(R)
m remains within H′ which can
be denoted as
Pˆ (R)m H
′ ≡
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H′ : Pˆ (R)m |Ψ〉
}
⊂ H′ . (25)
The elements of every set L(Pˆ
(R)
m ), explicitly,
L
(
Pˆ (R)m
)
=
{
ran(0ˆ), ran(Pˆ (R)m ), ran(¬Pˆ
(R)
m ), ran(1ˆ)
}
, (26)
form the invariant-subspace lattice (L(Pˆ
(R)
m ),≤), a complete complemented distributive lattice (a
Boolean algebra) [14]. As it is obvious, each set L(Pˆ
(R)
m ) only contains the closed linear subspaces
belonging to the mutually commutable projection operators.
From here one can conclude that the nontrivial closed linear subspace ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) can only belong
to the poset L(Pˆ
(R)
m ) while ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ), where Q 6= R, – only to L(Pˆ
(Q)
n ). Being elements of different
lattices, these nontrivial closed linear subspaces cannot meet each other. In symbols,
Q 6= R, ran(Pˆ (Q)n ) ∈ L(Pˆ
(Q)
n ), ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) ∈ L(Pˆ
(R)
m ) =⇒ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )✟✟∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) , (27)
where the cancelation of ∧ indicates that this operation cannot be defined.
The nonexistence of the meet operation for pairs of the ranges that do not lie in a common invariant-
subspace lattice corresponds to truth-value gaps in the supervaluational logic.
To be sure, consider the proposition P
(R)
m and its negation ¬P
(R)
m . If the realization of the qubit is
given by the state |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉, they are:
P (R)m = Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )✟✟∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m )
)
, (28)
¬P (R)m = Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )✟✟∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m+(−1)m−1
)
)
. (29)
As the operation✟✟∧ is undefined, the proposition P
(R)
m and its negation ¬P
(R)
m cannot have a truth
value in the state |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 (to borrow the terminology from the paper [10], they are not actual in this
state), that is,
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b
(
P (R)m
)
= b
(
Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )✟✟∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m )
))
=
0
0
, (30)
b
(
¬P (R)m
)
= b
(
Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )✟✟∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m+(−1)m−1
)
))
=
0
0
, (31)
where b stands for the bivalent valuation relation, i.e., the function from the set of propositions into
the set {0, 1} of bivalent truth values, and 00 denotes an indeterminate value.
In contrast to this, the propositions
Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧
(
ran(Pˆ (R)m ) ∨ ran(¬Pˆ
(R)
m )
))
and (32)
Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧
(
ran(Pˆ (R)m ) ∧ ran(¬Pˆ
(R)
m )
))
(33)
have a defined truth-value because
ran(Pˆ (R)m ) ∨ ran(¬Pˆ
(R)
m ) = C
2 and (34)
ran(Pˆ (R)m ) ∧ ran(¬Pˆ
(R)
m ) = {0} (35)
are the trivial elements of every invariant-subspace lattice and, hence, can meet the subspace
ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ). In symbols,
{
{0}, ran(Pˆ (Q)n )
}
⊂ L(Pˆ (Q)n ) =⇒ {0} ∧ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∈ L(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) , (36)
{
ran(Pˆ (Q)n ), C
2
}
⊂ L(Pˆ (Q)n ) =⇒ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧C
2 ∈ L(Pˆ (Q)n ) . (37)
Given
b
(
Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )
))
= 1 , (38)
b
(
Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ {0}
))
= 0 , (39)
the propositions (32) and (33) are, in terms of supervaluationism, supertrue and superfalse, corre-
spondingly.
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On the other hand, seeing as the ranges ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) and ran(¬Pˆ
(R)
m ) are members of the Boolean
lattice (L(Pˆ
(R)
m ),≤), one can maintain a classical logical interpretation of the meet and join of these
subspaces and consequently present
P (R)m ∨ ¬P
(R)
m = Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧ C
2
)
= Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )
)
, (40)
P (R)m ∧ ¬P
(R)
m = Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧ {0}
)
= Prop
(
|Ψ(Q)n 〉 ∈ {0}
)
. (41)
Therefore, even though the proposition P
(R)
m and its negation ¬P
(R)
m have no truth value in the
state |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉, their disjunction and conjunction are true and false, respectively, under any possible
realization of the qubit, namely, b(P
(R)
m ∨ ¬P
(R)
m ) = 1 and b(P
(R)
m ∧ ¬P
(R)
m ) = 0.
In this sense, the supervaluational semantics of quantum propositions does not violate the classi-
cal principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction (according to which a proposition and its
negation cannot be both true [4]).
4 Many-valued quantum logic
One may say that “gappy” propositions like (28) and (29) have no truth value for the reason that
they do not belong to the domain of two-valued logic. Therefore, one may assign to “gappy” propo-
sitions a new – i.e., different from true and false – truth-value (called, for example, “undetermined”)
and assume that the image of this new truth-value under the valuation relation lies between 0 and
1. By doing so, one can construct a many-valued semantics of quantum propositions which defines
the same logic as the supervaluational semantics does.
For example, in the infinite-valued semantics of quantum propositions proposed in a series of works
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19], the valuation v (i.e., the function from the set of propositions into the interval
[0, 1] of the infinite-valued truth degrees) is set forth by
v
(
P (Q)n
)
= 〈Ψ|Pˆ (Q)n |Ψ〉 ∈ [0, 1] . (42)
As it can be readily seen from here, if the realization of the qubit is given by the state |Ψ
(R)
m 〉, then
the truth degree of the proposition P
(R)
1 must be 〈Ψ
(R)
m |Pˆ
(R)
1 |Ψ
(R)
m 〉, which is 1 or 0.
By contrast, in the case where the realization of the qubit is given by the superposition of the states
|Ψ
(R)
1 〉 and |Ψ
(R)
2 〉, the truth degree of the proposition P
(R)
m and its negation ¬P
(R)
m are
v
(
P (R)m
)
= 〈Ψ(Q)n |Pˆ
(R)
m |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 ∈ (0, 1) , (43)
v
(
¬P (R)m
)
= 〈Ψ(Q)n |¬Pˆ
(R)
m |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 =
(
1− 〈Ψ(Q)n |Pˆ
(R)
m |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉
)
∈(0, 1) . (44)
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In this way, what is regarded as truth-value gaps in the supervaluational semantics is filled out
with the truth degrees lying between 0 and 1 in the many-valued semantics.
However, the many-valued semantics exhibits a problem pertaining to the interpretation of the
truth degrees. To illustrate this problem, suppose that the gaps b(P
(R)
1 ) =
0
0 and b(¬P
(R)
1 ) =
0
0 are
filled with the truth degrees in a manner that v(P
(R)
1 ) 6= v(¬P
(R)
1 ), which, according to (43) and
(44), entails 〈Ψ
(Q)
n |Pˆ
(R)
1 |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 6=
1
2 . The question is, what does such a difference mean?
The difficulty with this question is that there does not exist a standard interpretation of the truth
degrees and, therefore, how the difference 〈Ψ
(Q)
n |Pˆ
(R)
1 |Ψ
(Q)
n 〉 6=
1
2 is to be understood depends on
the chosen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Thus, in Quantum Bayesianism, i.e., the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics [20, 21], the said
difference represents the inequality in the degrees of belief of an agent regarding the proposition
P
(R)
1 and its negation. Whereas, under the Copenhagen interpretation, the same difference may be
understood as the contrast in the degrees to which the qubit possesses and does not possess the
property P
(R)
1 before its verification.
5 Counterfactual definiteness of quantum logic
From what is argued in the Section 3, it follows that the failure of PEM demonstrated in (17) and
(18) is caused by the “gapless” structure of the Hilbert lattice (L(C2),≤).
Given Σ, the collection of all the nontrivial projection operators on C2, namely,
Σ =
{
Σ(R))
}3
R=1
=
{
Pˆ
(R)
1 , Pˆ
(R)
2
}3
R=1
, (45)
the assumption of the Hilbert lattice is formally equivalent to the statement that for the collection
of L(Pˆ
(R)
m ), there exists a set-theoretic union L(C2), i.e.,
L(C2) =
⋃
Pˆ
(R)
m ∈Σ
L(Pˆ (R)m ) , (46)
or, explicitly,
{
{0}, ran(Pˆ
(1)
1 ), ran(Pˆ
(1)
2 ), . . . , ran(Pˆ
(3)
2 ),C
2
}
=
⋃
Pˆ
(R)
m ∈Σ
{
{0}, ran(Pˆ (R)m ), ran(Pˆ
(R)
m+(−1)m−1
),C2
}
. (47)
This statement brings on the meet operation on any pairs of the closed subspaces of C2, i.e.,
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{
ran(Pˆ (Q)n ), ran(Pˆ
(R)
m )
}
⊂
⋃
Pˆ
(R)
m ∈Σ
L(Pˆ (R)m ) =⇒ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
m ) ∈
⋃
Pˆ
(R)
m ∈Σ
L(Pˆ (R)m ) , (48)
thus implying that a proposition and its negation may be both false.
Semantically, though, the statement (46) is consistent with the assumption of counterfactual defi-
niteness.
Recall that counterfactual definiteness is the ability to speak meaningfully of the definiteness of
the results of measurements that have not been performed [22]. Equally, this term can be used to
imply the ability to assign a definite truth value to a proposition that has not yet been verified.
Along the lines of counterfactual definiteness, the existence of the meet operation on the col-
umn spaces of the incommutable projection operators Pˆ
(Q)
n and Pˆ
(R)
m stated in (48) means that
the proposition like Prop
(
|Ψ〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n ) ∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
1 )
)
asserting that “Had the verification of
P
(Q)
n = Prop
(
|Ψ〉 ∈ ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )
)
been performed, the truth value of P
(R)
1 would have been obtained”
always has a definite truth value even though the simultaneous verifications of P
(Q)
n and P
(R)
1 were
not carried due to the incommutability of Pˆ
(Q)
n and Pˆ
(R)
m .
In this way, the “gappy” lattice structure of the supervaluationary logic of quantum proposi-
tions rejects counterfactual definiteness inasmuch as a truth value of the proposition Prop
(
|Ψ〉 ∈
ran(Pˆ
(Q)
n )✚∧ ran(Pˆ
(R)
1 )
)
cannot be defined.
6 Concluding remarks
Being omnipresent in classical logic, the principle of excluded middle plays an important role in
the issue of macroscopic realism [23].
In terms of Schrodinger’s cat gedanken experiment [24] (where the premise is that the macroscop-
ically distinguishable states “dead” and “alive” are the quantum states of the “cat”), given that
after the verification of its status, the cat can be only found in one of the two quantum states –
either dead or alive – macroscopic realism asserts that the cat is always is in one of these states,
even before the verification. As a consequence, the proposition P = “the cat is dead” and its
negation ¬P = “the cat is alive” cannot be both false not only after the verification but also prior
to the verification. Hence, macroscopic realism implies that the quantum propositions obey PEM.
Typically, to negate macroscopic realism, the rejection of PEM is considered and, consequently, an
intuitionistic approach to quantum logic is sought (see, e.g., [9]). However, as it has been shown in
this paper, supervaluational quantum logic refutes macroscopic realism as well.
To be sure, according to the supervaluationist account of Schrodinger’s cat gedanken experiment,
when the cat is in the superposition state, the disjunction P ∨ ¬P and conjunction P ∧ ¬P are
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true and false, correspondingly, but neither P nor ¬P is actual. That is, the statement “Out of
two possible states, dead and alive, the cat is in one or the other but not in both” is true despite
the fact the statement “The cat is in one of these states” has absolutely no truth-value before the
verification.
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